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30-3-5(6) Utah Code Annotated 8 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, with the 
Honorable John Rokich, District Court Judge Presiding, 
to the Utah Court of Appeals and is authorized pursuant to 78-2a-3 
(2) (i) of the Utah Code Annotated as amended in 1992. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. When the receiving spouse is residing with a member 
of the opposite sex, and engaging in sexual relations, no 
alimony whatsoever, should be ordered. The standard of review, 
is a question of fact and is to be reviewed for correctness, 
with a presumption that the lower Court was dorrect in its 
analysis. Berube vs. Fashion Centre, Ltd. 771 P. 2d 1033 
(Utah 1989) . 
2. No alimony should be awarded to the Plaintiff as 
the Court made no findings supporting the basis for tiie same. 
The standard of review is a question of law, and reviewed 
for correctness with no deference to the lower court's 
determination. Berube vs. Fashion Centre Ltd. 771 P. 2d 
1033, (Utah 1989). 
3. Not only did the lower Court fail to make appropriate 
Findings of Fact, it failed to actually consider the appropriate 
criteria for an award of alimony. The standard of review 
if a question of an abuse of discretion. Burt vs. Burt, 799 
P. 2d 1166, (Utah App. 1990). 
4. It was a clear abuse of discretion to award the 
Plaintiff with permanent alimony. The Standard of Review is an 
abuse of discretion. Stevens vs. Stevens, 754 P. 2d 952, (Utah 
App. 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES: 
30-3-5(6) Utah Code Annotated: 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony 
to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by 
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, 
if it is further established by the person receiving 
alimony that that relationship or association is 
without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall 
resume. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A~)*3ellant submits that it was clear abuse of discretion 
to award permanent alimony is a four year ten month marriage. 
It is true that one of the purposes of alimony is to ensure 
that the receiving spouse is not on the public dole. However, 
in this case, the receiving spouse was residing with a member 
of the opposite sex, and admitted to having sexual relations 
with him. 
The lower Court failed to make appropriate FINDINGS OF 
FACT, supporting an award of alimony, but moreover failed 
to appropriately apply the said criteria in determining alimony. 
Then clearly abused its discretion in making the same 
permanent. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals from 
a determination in the Third Judicial District Oourt, that the 
Appellant pay permanent alimony to an ex-wife of a marriage 
that lasted four years and ten months, when the ex-wife is 
living with a member of the opposite sex, and engaging in 
sexual relations. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff filed an action in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in an for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to dissolve 
the marriage between herself and husband. The matter came 
on for trial for two half days on December 5, and December 6, 
1991, before the Honorable John Rokich District Court Judge 
Presiding. 
DISPOSITION AT THE TRIAL COURT 
The District Court awarded the Plaintiff permanent alimony 
from which the Appellant now appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties began having sexual relations while in high 
School, (T-9.) Which resulted in the Plaintiff hprnminor rk-rocrnnnt-
before either party had finished high school. (T-10 and 109). 
Each of the parties then completed high school after 
they were married and their first child was born six months 
after they were married. (T-10). 
Plaintiff thereafter had two more children, (twins), while 
the Defendant went on to college part time. Defendant attended 
college for five years, and was a Junior at the time of divorce, 
and had topped out on the pay acalo for a painter at $9.00 
per hour. (T-209). 
Plaintiff worked during the marriage selling shoes, and 
was making $5.00 an hour at the time that she stopped working, 
even though she would have been making as much as $8.00 per hour 
had she stayed working where she was, and perhaps even become 
a manager and making $18,000.00 to $20,000.00 per year. (T. 215) 
At the time of trial Plaintiff admitted that a male 
friend with whom she was having sex , (T-45) had moved his 
television into the parties home some ten months before trial, 
as well as other living room furniture. In addition, this male 
friend had moved his belongings into the garage at about the 
same time. (T. 47) 
In addition, Plaintiff testified that his truck has 
been parked in the garage some five or six months before trial, 
and that she regularly drove the same. (T-48) 
A mutual friend testified that Plaintiff and this male 
friend were living together, as did the Defendant testify that 
that was what the Plaintiff had told him. 
The Court heard the testimony of the parties regarding 
alimony, and marital debts etc., and ultimately awarded the 
Plaintiff permanent alimony in the sum of $200.00 per month. 
From this determination the Defendant now appeals: 
ARGUMENT ONE 
WHEN THE RECEIVING SPOUSE IN RESIDING WITH A MEMBER 
OF THE OPPOSITE SEX, AND ENGAGING IN SEXUAL RELATIONS 
NO ALIMONY WHATSOEVER, SHOULD BE ORDERED. 
In this case, there can be no question that the 
Plaintiff was residing with a member of the opposite sex and 
that they were having sexua] relations. 
A }ourg man by the name of Rick Onesto, moved his 
furniture into the home of the Plaintiff, which has been mingled 
with the furniture that the Plaintiff was awarded in the divorce 
action. He has his television, which is used from day to day, 
by the Plaintiff and the parties children. (T-45), while the one 
that was awarded to the Plaintiff in the divorce action, is 
five years old, and so it is not being used. (T-201). 
In addition to the television set which has been mingled 
into the personal property awarded to the Plaintiff in the action, 
this young man has other furniture which has been mingled into 
the same. (T-45). 
In fact, this young man's furniture was moved in some 
ten months or so before the divorce was finalized. (T-46). 
In addition to the foregoing, this young man has used 
the garage for storage of his personal items. (T-47). 
Not only has this young man been residing in the home 
of Plaintiff's, as reflected in moving his furniture in, but 
he in fact, does his laundry there, as testified by the Plaintiff. 
(T-45). 
At the time of trial, Defendant called as a witness a 
Mr. Eric Roos, who was very good friends of both the Plaintiff 
and the Defendant, as well as the Plaintiff's new found love, 
Rick Onesto. 
Beginning at page 118, of the transcript, Eric Roos, 
testified on direct examination as follows: 
Q. Do you know the parties in this action? 
Yes. 
How long have you knoxm the parties in this action? 
Approximately five years. 
Five Years? 
Getting close to that. 
Almost the entire marriage in this case? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A Close. I don't know exactly how long they were 
married before we met. 
Q. You don't take sides in this particular action, 
do you? 
A. I care about the both of these guys and I -- They're 
my best friends I had, both of them. 
Q. Have you had occasion to observed whether or not 
the Plaintiff in this case, Uendy Weaver, has had 
someone living in the home where she presently 
resides? 
A. Yes. I --
Q. Over what period of time? 
A. Since when I found out about the two had split up 
and what had --
Q. I don't want to lead you here, but let me get to 
the bottom line. Would that be at or abcut the 
fall of last year until now? 
A. Somewhere in there, yeah. 
Are tell me why and how frequently that would be? 
I have friends that live near Wendy and they watch 
our kids. We bring them there in the morning and 
pick them up in the afternoon, and we would spend 
weekends with them. 
Would you have occasion then to see cars, for examp 
parked at the home of Wendy, and whoever, there day 
-to-day? 
Yeah. The corner house, almost corner house. 
Are you familiar with a gentleman's truck, gentle-
man and truck by the name of Rick Onesto? 
Yeah. 
How do you know Rick? 
Good friends, too. We were all living together 
and we were all the best of friends, all of us 
were. 
Let me clarify a point, if I might. Do you have 
a sitter that's at or about the same general 
vicinity of where Wendy resides? 
Yeah. 
In addition to that, are you saying that you're 
Rick and Wendy's as well as Tom Weaver's good 
friend? 
Yes, I am. 
And are you telling me that you do things socially 
with Wendy and Rick? 
We used to quite often. Well, not now with Wendy 
and Rick so much anymore. Or Tom, I haven't seen 
as much of Tom. I seen Wendy and Rick mostly. 
Are you familiar with the truck that Mr. Onesto 
drives? 
Yeah. 
Could you describe that, quickly. 
Ford Bronco, light blue, two-tone silver blue. 
Kow do you know that belongs to him? 
He's had it since we lived in Villa Franche 
Apartments, approximately two or three years ago. 
When you go by to drop your children off in the 
mornings, what time frame are we talking about? 
It's usually about 3 o'clock. 
Okay. 
Well, probably -- usually around 7:30, sometimes 
8:00. 
Are there times that you're there earlier than 7:30? 
Yes. 
How early would that be at times? 
Sometimes 6:30. It all depends on what time I 
have to get to work. 
Do you pick the children up as well? 
Yes. 
What time did you pick the children up? 
Sometimes about, depending on if I stay late, 
could be 6 o'clock. 
In reference to Rick Oneoto and Wendy Weaver sociall 
what times would you have been with the two of them? 
Mostly they came up and visited my house when they'r 
done -- my wife, we come over and say Hi, a couple 
of times. 
When you do things socially does that ever go into 
the evenings? 
No. 
Do you ever go over to her home and watch videos? 
No. 
Okay. Let me clarify. From the fall of last year 
until now, has there ever been any period of time 
where you could conclude that their blue bronco 
wasn't parked at the home weird hours of the day 
and night from then until now? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you had occasion to talk to Rick and Wendy 
about the fact that they are presently living 
together? 
A. Well, they came to my place. That's where P.ick 
stays. 
Then on page 126 of the transcript, while still under 
direct examination, is the following: 
Q. Have you had occasion to observe whether or not the 
Bronco was there at Wendy Weaver's home in the middle 
of the night? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. Tell me about that, real quickly. 
A. Spend weekends drinking --
Mr. Searle: Your Honor, I object uo the effective voir 
dire or --
THE COURT: He can answer. 
Mr. Searle: Objection. Lack of foundation, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Lay a foundation. 
Q. (BY MR. WALSH) When was this, Mr. Roos? 
A. We drink every weekend, play family feud and piction-
ary until two, three in the morning, regularly. 
Q. Okay. Late at night. So did you have occasion to 
go by the home then two or three in the morning, 
like from weekend to weekend? 
A. Yeah. We drive -- we pull out of the driveway; it's 
right where you can see it. 
Q. And did you or did you not observe the Bronco, at 
two or three in the morning each weekend? 
A. Yeah, I seen the Bronco there. Whether he was there 
or not, that I can't say. But the Bronco was there. 
Lastly, in reference to this witness he testified, on 
redirect examination at page 131 of the transcript as follows: 
Q. Do you see Wendy's car there at the same time that 
you see Rick Onestofs truck there? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Do you -- as you sit here and try to best recall 
what you observed over this time frame over the last 
year plus, can you ever visualize a time when the 
truck or car were not both parked there at the same 
time? 
A. I guess there would be a few times when one car 
is there, or either the Bronco is there. 
Q. What about the majority — excuse me? 
A. The majority of time, it's there. 
In an apparent effort to hide the fact that Rick Onesto, 
has been residing with the Plaintiff, Plaintiff testified that 
his truck is parked in the garage, and her car is parked on the 
street. (T-47) . 
Not only did the Plaintiff admit in court that Rick 
Onesto had his furniture there, and his items in storage in the 
garage, and that his truck was parked in the garage, and for the 
length of time it was, but Defendant himself stated that he refused 
to continue to pay for the Plaintiff, once he found out that she 
was residing with Rick Onesto. 
At page 143, and continuing onto page 144 of the tran-
script when Plaintiff was being examined by his own counsel is 
the following: 
Q. Did you pay rent after December, 1990? 
A. No. I stopped paying it. 
Q. Why? 
A. I found out that Rick had been livino ^-^^^ ~~A T 
felt that why sould I pay for soma other guy 
living there. 
Q. How did you know Rick was living there? 
A. From friends that had told me, and Wendy had told 
at one time. 
Q. That Rick was there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did she tell you that? 
A. This would be shortly after the deer hunt, October, 
the end of October. 
Q. Of what year? 
A. That she was seeing him in f90 and he really didn't 
-- you know how you kind of brush it off. For sure 
I knew in December. I found out in '90, December. 
She admitted it and friends were admitting it and 
neighbors were admitting it, and 1 just wasn't going 
to pay anymore. 
When cross examined about not paying for the utilities 
anymore, by the Plaintiff's Counsel, Defendant, testified at 
page 168 as follows: 
Q. And I think your testimony was that you were being 
told by somebody else she was befriended by another 
gentlemen, is that a correct statement? That's 
what you said, I believe, didn't you? 
A. I wasn't going to pay -- I was going to pay for my 
kids, but not Wendy, No, because she was living with 
somebody else. I was not going to pay for somebody 
else to est my steak, pay for somebody else to live 
there. 
During further cross examination by Plaintiff's Counsel, 
Defendant continued on page 170: 
Q. So you had all this money -- now you object to 
taking and paying her anything because you say she 
had a man friend? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And this man friend was providing her with what 
services that you know? 
A. I don't know whether he was providing her with 
anything. 
Q. So you don't know anything at all about what he was 
doing concerning the relationship. 
A. He was living there, but I don't know if he was 
providing anything. 
Q. How do you know he was living there? In whac respect? 
A. She told me at one time that they were living together. 
Q. Is that the only basis? 
A. Somebody tells you something like that and I guess 
you just believe it. 
Q. You assumed, right? 
A. No, she told me. 
Under the foregoing facts, there can be no question 
that the Plaintiff is barred from any alimony whatsoever. 
The Utah State Legislature considered this very problem 
of the receiving spouse having a member of the opposite sex 
free loading on the ex-spouse paying alimony, and mandated the 
following in 30-3-5(6) Utah Code Annotated as amended in 1991: 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony 
to a former spouse terminates upon establishment 
by the party paying alimony that the former spouse 
is residing with a person of the opposite sex. 
However, if it is further established by the 
person receiving alimony that that relationship 
or association is without any sexual contact. 
payment of alimony shall resume. 
Defendant submits that once the evidence established 
that Plaintiff was residing with a member of the opposite sex, 
the burden shifted to her, to prove that there was no sexual 
contact between herself and her live-in lover, Ps.ick Onesto. 
In the case of Hacker vs. Wackey 688 P.2d 533 (Utah 
1983) The Utah Supreme Court, stated -.page 534, regarding this 
statute as follows: 
The statute placed the initial burden of proof on the 
person seeking to avoid alimony to show that the former 
spouse is "residing11 with a person of the opposite sex. 
Once residence with a person of the opposite sex is 
established, alimony obligations are terminated unless 
the person receiving alimony can show that the relation-
ship is " without any sexual contact." 
At trial, the Plaintiff did not come forward with any 
evidence that there was no sexual contact, and put no evidence, 
whatsoever to that effect. 
Rather, Plaintiff herself testified that she had engaged 
in sexual relations with Rick Onesto on page 46, on cross 
examination by Defendant's Counsel: 
Q. In fact you have had relations with this guy, have 
you not? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Defendant submits that all he need do to prevail on 
the issue of alimony is establish that Plaintiff is residing 
with a member of the opposite sex. 
That is to say, he does not need to come forward and 
establish that in addition to residing with a member of the 
opposite sex she is having sexual relations with him. 
Rather it is her burden to establish that the relation-
ship is " without any sexual contact, fl after Defendant has 
established that Rick Onesto resides with her. 
In this case, Defendant not only established that she 
was residing with a member of the opposite sex, but Defendant 
also established by way of the Plaintiff herself, that she and 
Rick Onesto were having sexual relations. 
Surely, there is no basis to award her alimony at all. 
The case at bat, is easily distinguishable from the 
case of Knuteson vs. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387, ( Utah, 1980), 
decided by the Utah Supreme Court three years earlier than the 
Wacker case cited above. 
In Knuteson, the husband refused to pay Court ordered 
alimony leaving the wife in a destitute set of circumstances, 
where she had to reach out for help from a male friend, and in 
fact never resided with the said male friend, even though they 
had engaged in sexual relations. 
At page 1389, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Other and perhaps more cogent and realistic reasons 
to affirm the trial court's decision to the effect that 
Mrs. Knuteson was not a ''resident1' in Gay Conder' s home 
in the statutory sense, is that she expended much of her 
efforts in the daytime at her own home doing chores and 
yard work; and secondly, the wording of the statute does 
not appear to cover a temporary stay at another's house. 
This latter reason is furnished by defendant's counsel 
himself, who says in his brief that Webster's new 
Twentieth Century Dictionary, 2nd Edition, defines 
the word "reside" as: To dwell permanently or for a 
length of time; to have a settled abode for a time, 
(emphasis original). 
In the case at bar, the Plaintiff herself testified that 
Rick Onesto had his furniture in her home since February, had 
stored his things in the garage since that time, and that she 
had been driving his truck since July. Trial in this case 
occured on December 5 and 6, 1991, so the furniture would have 
been in her home for going on ten months, and the personal items 
in the garage for going on ten months, and driving his vehicle 
had been going on for more than five months. 
There can be no question that Rick Onesto resided with 
the Plaintiff in the statutory sense, and that no alimony should 
be awarded. This is particularly so, because in additon to the 
fact that Mr. Onesto is residing in the home of the parties, 
Plaintiff and Mr. Onesto, are living as man and wife, having 
sexual relations. 
The very policy that the State Legislature intended 
is perhaps best noted in the testimony of the Defendant where 
he stated on page 168: 
I wasn't going to pay -- I was going to pay for my 
kids, but not Wendy, because she was living with some-
body also. I was not going to pay for somebody else 
to eat my steak, pay for somebody else to live there. 
That by virtue of the foregoing, the Defendant requests 
that this Court reverse the lower Court, and eliminate alimony 
all together in this action. 
ARGUMENT TWO 
NO ALIMONY SHOULD BE AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF AS 
THE COURT MADE NO FINDINGS SUPPORTING THE BASIS FOR 
THE SAME 
The lower Court made the following FINDINGS CF FACT, as 
they apply to the payment of alimony by the Defendant: 
#3. Plaintiff and defendant were married to each other 
on the 30 day of November, 1985, in Boise, Idaho, 
and are presently husband and wife. 
#8. That the defendant is gainfully employed and earned 
as an employee of Universal Painting during 1990, 
the gross yearly sum of $15,296 and presently earns 
the gross amount of #1387.00 monthly. 
#10. Plaintiff is entitled to child support and alimony. 
The FINDINGS OF FACT are LOtally void of an> determination 
by the lower Court as to (1) the financial conditions and 
needs of the receiving spouse and (2) the ability of the receiving 
spouse to produce sufficient income for herself. 
For the purposes of appeal, the "findings of fact must 
show that decree follows logically from, and is supported by 
the evidence.'1 Morgan vs. Morgan, 795 P. 2d 684 (Utah App. 1990). 
The lower Court is required to go through a three prong 
analysis, in awarding alimony: 
1. The financial conditions and needs of the receiving 
spouse; 
2. The ability of the receiving spouse to produce a 
sufficient income for herself, and 
3. The ability of the responding spouse to provide 
support. 
Note Thomson vs. Thomson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1991). 
In the case of Bell vs. Bell, 810 P.2d 38^, 492, 
(Utah App. 1991), this court stated: 
Failure to consider the (three material) factors 
in fashioning an alimony award constitutes an abuse 
of discretion. See Stevens vs Stevens, 754 P.2d 
952, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing Paffell vs. Paffel,) 
trial court must make sufficently detailed findings 
of fact on each factor to enable a reviewing court 
to ensure that the trial court's discretionary 
determination was rationally based upon these three 
factors. See Davis vs. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648, 
(Utah, 1988); Stevens vs. Stevens,754 P.2d at 
958-59; see also Acton vs. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 
999 (Utah 1987) . If sufficient findings are not 
made, we must reverse unless the record is clear 
and uncontroverted such as to allow us to apply 
the Jones factors as a matter of law on appeal. 
See Asper vs. Asper, 753 P.2d 978, 981 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
The failure of the lower Court to analyze the needs 
of the wife, and the failure of the lower Court ot analyze her 
ability to provide for herself, each independantly, constitute 
an abuse discretion. 
"Failure to analyze the parties' circumstances in light 
of these three factors constitutes an abuse of discretion/' 
Thomson vs. Thomson, 810 P.2d 428 ( Utah App. 1991.) 
Not only must the lower Court specifically make the 
requisite FINDINGS £o? the Appellate Court to ensure that the 
trial Court's discretionary determination was rationally based 
on the three stated criteria, it is critically necessary for 
the lower Court to make the said FINDINGS with sufficient detail, 
and which consist of enough subsidiary facts to reveal the steps 
the Court took to reach its conclusion on each factual issue 
presented. Sampinos vs. Sampinos, 750 P.2d 615 (Utah App. 1988). 
Appellant respectfully submits that there can be no 
question that this Court must reverse the lower Court. Note 
Burt vs. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, (Utah App. 1990.), also Canning 
vs. Canning;, 744 P.2d 325, (Utah App. 1987) also Noble vs. Noble, 
761 P.2d 1369, (Utah, 1988), also Ruhsam vs, Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 
(Utah App. 1987) and lastly Rudman vs. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) . 
Not only did the lower Court fail to even make a 
reference in the FINDINGS as to the financial conditions and 
needs of the receiving spouse as well as the ability of the 
raceiving spouse to produce a sufficient income for herself 
the FINDINGS are absolutely void of any factors that enable 
a reviewing Court to determine if the trial court's discretionary 
determination was rationally based. 
In addition there are no detail whatsoever nor any 
subsidiary facts to reveal the steps the Court took to reach 
its conclusion regarding the needs and ability of the receiving 
spouse. 
Appellant submits that this Court must reverse the 
determination made by the lower Court, as there is no basis 
for an award of any alimony, under the present set of 
circumstances. 
ARGUMENT THREE 
NOT ONLY DID THE LOWER COURT FAIL TO MAKE APPROPRIATE 
FINDINGS OF FACT, IT FAILED TO ACTUALLY CONSIDER THE 
APPROPRIATE CRITERIA FOR AN AWARD OF ALIMONY. 
In this case, the Court not only failed to fashion 
appropriate FINDINGS OF FACT, regarding the three requirements 
for the award of alimony, the lower Court failed to appropriately 
consider the same in its award. 
In the case of Watson vs. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, (Utah App. 
1992), this Court stated at page 3: 
In formulating alimony awards, the trial court has 
broad discretion, and its decisions will not be 
overturned absent an abuse of discretion or manifest 
injustice. See Schindler vs. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 
90 (Utah App. 1989). In Schindler, this court 
outlined the factors to be considered by a trial court 
in determining alimony: 
In awarding alimony, appellate courts require the trial 
court to consider each of the following three factors: 
(1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving 
spouse; (2) The ability of the receiving spouse to 
produce sufficient income for him or herself; and (3) 
the ability of the responding spouse to provide support. 
If these three factors have been considered, we will 
not distrub the trial court's alimony award unless 
such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion. The ultimace test of an 
alimony award is whether the party receiving alimony 
will be able to support him or herself "as nearly 
as possible to the standard of living . . . .enjoyed 
during the marriage.11 English vs. English, 565 P. 2d 
409, 411 (Utah 1977). 
As to the first cirteria, the Court failed to consider 
the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse. 
In thit: ca^e the Plaintiff was to begin her life 
after the divorce, with no debt whatsoever. While the 
Defendant was to pay of all of the marital debt of the parties 
in the sum of $12,434.35, which was to pay off at the rate of 
$322.15 per month, as reflected on Defendant's Exhibit 9-D. 
In addition, the Plaintiff was awarded the personal 
property in the sum of $4,955.00, which did not include the 
award of the car to her. While the Defendant was awarded 
personal property in the sum of $600.00, which sum included his 
Mazda Pickup Truck, in the sum of $500.00. Note Defendant's 
Exhibit #13-D and Defendant's Exhibit 14-D. 
Defendant was awarded his 1986 Mazda Pickup Truck, which 
had 130,000 miles on it, bubject ot the indebtedness if any on 
the same, (T-153), and the Plaintiff in turn was awarded her 
1980 Buick Skylark, free and clear of any debt, and the Defendant 
was tc pay the $3,100.00 owing on the same, (T-19) 
Hence, wholly in addition to the foregoing debt service 
of $12,434.35, the Defendant was required to pay the $3,100.00 
for the car at $50.00 per month, to Defendant's father. (T-20) 
Since the Plaintiff failed to disclose all the sums 
she received from the Defendant to Recovery Services, he not 
only ended up paying her substantial sums to support herself 
and the children, he<- ended up owing the sum of $3,300.00 to 
ilecovery Services. (T-69) 
In addition to the foregoing the Court did not eet a 
clue from the Plaintiff as tc her real needs, as Plaintiff's 
Exhibit #21-P reflects needs, etc., based on the fact that the 
Plaintiff is on public assistance, with Medicaid suppling medical 
and dental care. 
This coupled with the fact, that the Court was never given 
any evidence of what was required to maintain the Plaintiff's 
household, as: thxougiithe marriage of the parties the Defendant's 
folks contributed "assistance and help" as did the Plaintiff's 
folks. 
In fact, a fair amount of the trial surrounded the various 
loans that the Defendant had taken out with his father. (T-48) 
As noted on page 156-157, the Defendant testified on 
examination by his own counsel as follows: 
Q. Now, you heard her testify yesturday that she has 
$410 coming for your children from welfare, is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. She's getting another $60.00 over and above what 
she gets for child care. So total welfare payments 
are approximately $470 a month. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In addition she has $300 in food stamps. Did you 
hear her testify about: that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Approximately $700, plus or minus? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Are you telling me that on top of that you are 
paying her $6,000 from August 1 until now that has 
nothing to so with that $700 that she's getting 
from public assistance? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It is your testimony that on top of all that, she's 
run up accounts which are the subject of these other 
exhibits here where she geus demand letters from the 
University of Utah Credit Union, and Sears, etcetera, 
etcetera, etcetera? 
A. That' s correct. 
In additional places it was clearly established at the 
time of trial that the Plaintiff was getting money or having 
her rent paid, etc., at the same time that she was getting public 
assistance from Recovery Srecives. Mote for example the 
transcript at page 169 and 170. 
Bottomline, the Court was totally in the dark as to what 
the needs were of the receiving spouse, because she was getting 
so much money and from so many sources, yet testifying in her 
own behalf that she was getting little or nothing, and that 
was why she was on welfare. 
When questioned with cancelled checks, however, the 
Plaintiff admitted that she had in fact received various sums 
but could not just remember the same. 
On page 64 of the transcript, on cross examination she 
stated: 
Q. So when you testified earlier today that he didnft 
give you any money either immediately before the 
time or after the time you separated, that is not 
true, is it Wendy? 
A. You could say, no, it's not true. He did give me 
a certain portion of funds until -- as you notice 
that they stopped in December. 
Q. Can you tell me what other funds he paid you? 
A. What other funds he paid me? I don't remember. 
Hence, the lower Court heard evidence that he paid 
nothing, by the Plaintiff. Then the Court heard that he paid 
various amounts, but Plaintiff could not remember all of what 
they were. Then the Defendant testified that he gave her as 
much as $6,000.00. In addition, the Defendant presented Exhibit 
#9-D showing that she had run up certain bills with charge cards, 
etc., in the sum of $12,434.35. In addition, the lower Court 
heard that she was receiving $410.00 for public assistance for 
the children, and an additional $60.00 for herself, coupled 
with food stamps in the sum of $308.00. (T-41) 
Bottomline, the Court heard not only conflicting evidence 
that one would expect in any trial, but testimony that was 
recanted, almost completely. All from the Plaintiff. 
In addition thereto, the Defendant placed into evidence 
substantial sums that the Defendant has been receiving, but 
not disclosing to the State. 
Through the two versions of the evidence, it was not 
disputed that the Plaintiff was receiving $778.00 in public 
assistance and food stamps. 
As a result, with this great divergence in the evidence 
the Court was faced with deciding what ffthe financial conditions 
and needs of the receiving spouse11 were. 
However, no where in the FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW or DECREE OF DIVORCE is there a clue. 
Hence, there is no bisis as a matter of practicality, 
for an award of $200.00 per month alimony to the Plaintiff, 
based upon th financial conditions and needs of the Plaintiff. 
Not only did the lower Court fail to address the financ-
ial conditions and needs of the Plaintiff, the Court similarly 
failed to address the ability of the receiving spouse to produce 
sufficient income for herself. 
As a matter of fact, Plaintiff became pregnant while 
in high school, however, graduated from high school after the 
parties were married. (T-9 and 10) 
Plaintiff was not only capable of working, she worked 
during the parties marriage, as reflected on Exhibit 3-P. In 
fact, she worked even while was pregnant. (T-38) At times 
she worked a full 40 hour week. (T-38) 
Plaintiff started out working at $4.50 an hour, but 
increased in salary to $5.00 per hour in 1989, when she stopped 
working. 
At the end of trial, the parties stipulated to Defendant's 
father's testimony, as was proffered into evidence, as follows 
at page 215 of the transcript: 
Mr. Tom Weaver, Sr., would testify he employed 
Wendy Weaver at times and found her to be an outstanding 
employee with qualifications in sales. And he would 
testify she would draw a wage at $8.00 an hour, and 
by now, if she continued to work for him, she would 
be making in excess of what Tom Weaver makes, and 
she would be a managar drawing between 18 and 
$20,000.00. 
The lower Court totally ignored the Plaintiff's ability 
to work, and assist in the total financial picture. 
However, the lower Court heard the Plaintiff testify in 
several places that she needed the marital car, so she could 
get a job. Note for example the transcript at page 21 and 58. 
The lower Court then gives her the car, so she can get 
a job, but totally ignores her own ability to produce sufficient 
income for herself and then on top of all of this makes the 
Defendant pay for her car. (T-52) 
Plaintiff even testified that she was attempting to 
find work, at page 59 is the following on Cross Examination: 
Q. Are you applying now for work? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. Where have you applied? 
A. I have applied at Zions First National bank and 
applied at West One bank, and I would have had the 
job at West One Bank, but they did not hire 
relatives. I applied at key Bank. I walked 
through the mall and applied at malls, Shcpko. 
I'm willing to take just about anything. 
Q. If you would have been accepted at West One, what 
would you have done at West One? 
A. Bank Telling. 
Q. And how much would you make as a Bank Teller? 
A. How much would I make as a Bank Teller? Six dollars 
to start. 
Q. Would that be a 40-hour week? 
A. Forty-hour week. 
Defendant respectfully submits that there is not even 
a clue, that the lower Court considered these facts, in awarding 
a permanent alimony to the Plaintiff of $200.00 per month. 
Lastly, as to the last inquiry of the three prong 
test, ie "the ability of the responding spouse to provide 
support1/ the only clue is a blank statement of his gross earnings 
as found in FINDING OF FACT #8, which states: 
8. That the defendant is gainfully employed and 
earned as an employee of Universal Painting during 
1990, the gross yearly sum of $15,29b and presently 
earns the gross amount of $1,387.00 monthly. 
The court made no finding as to his net income, nor is 
there any basis to conclude that the Court considered the fact 
that the Defendant's wages were being garnished for back child 
support from Recovery Services, for a time when he was paying 
the Plaintiff directly, but she did not disclose the same. 
Futhermore, there is no clue that the Court considered 
what his income had done historically. It is interesting 
to note that by the Plaintiff's own exhibits, Defendants income 
actually decreased from the years 1989 to 1990. Note Exhibit 
#3-P which shows income for 1989 from wages,etc. at $16,457.44, 
and Exhibit #4-P which shows income for 1990 for wages, etc. 
at $15,296.50. 
As a result, it appears that with the $1,387.00 per month 
as reflected in FINDING OF FACT #8, which was a gross wage, 
the Defendant was to pay child support of $410.00, pay for recovery 
services in the sum of $3,300.00 total; pay insurance for the 
minor children (T-221); pay for the car that the Plaintiff was 
awarded in the sum of $3,100.00 (although she is awarded the 
car); pay for all of the marital debt that the parties had 
accumulated in the sum of $12,434.35, and then before he had one 
dime for himself, he was to pay the Plaintiff the sum of 
$200.00 per month as permanent alimony. 
This is riot a case like the Court sees all of the time, where 
there just is not enough to go around. 
This is a case where the Plaintiff just has to work, and 
there is no question about it. 
If she had continued to work, she would be making more 
than the Defendant at upwards of $20,000.00 per year, which was 
all undisputed. (T-215) 
On the otherhand, here is a young man that is already 
struggling to get back, working just as much as he possibly can. 
(T-95) 
This young man has been driving without car insurance 
since April, some eight months plus before trial (T-99). 
Defendant respectfully submits that in applying the 
standards set down in Watson supra, this is not a case where 
alimony is appropriate, and absolutely not a case for permanent 
alimony. 
ARGUMENT FOUR 
IT WAS CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO AWARD 
THE PLAINTIFF WITH PERMANENT ALIMONY 
From the time that the paruies had to get married, 
November 1985 (t-187) to the time that she filed for divorce, 
September 1990, (T-7), the parties were married some 4 years 
and ten months, or so. 
During that period of time the parties had done a 
lot of growing up, as they both were in High School when they 
got married. (T-10 and 109). 
Plaintiff had completed High School after getting married, 
(T-10) and the Defendant was still a Junior and had not even 
began working on his major, ie: Accounting. (T-192). 
Defendant submits that it was clear abuse of discretion 
to award permanent alimony. 
it is true that length of the marriage is not zhe only 
factor in considering alimony. Surely it is a factor however. 
Note Boyle vs. Boyle, 735 P. 2d 669, (Utah App. 1987) 
In addition, alimony was never intended to be a punish-
ment nor a reward. Note Gramme vs. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144, (Utah 
1978) also Turner vs. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, (Utah 1982). 
One of the purposes of alimony, is to "enable the 
receiving spouse to maintain, as nearly as possible, the standard 
of living enjoyed during the marriage, and (prevent) the receiving 
spouse from becoming a public charge.1* Munns vs. Munns, 790 P2d 
116, 121 (Utah App. 1990) . 
Note also, Paffel vs. Paffel, 732 P. 2d 96, (Utah 1986) 
Bushell vs. Bushell, 649 P. 2d 85, (Utah 1982); Burt vs. Burt, 
799 P.2d 1166, (Utah App. 1990); Talley vs. Talley, 739 P. 2d 
83, (Utah App. 1987); Georgedes vs. Georgedes, 627 P.2d 44, 
(Utah 1981) and Fletcher vs. Fletcher, 615 T.2d 1218, (Utah 1980). 
Defendant respectfully submits that this may be exactly 
what the Court has caused rather than cured. 
In this case the Plaintiff was reveiving $410.00 for the 
three children on public assistance. (T-40) and she was receiving 
$60.00 for herself from public assistance, (T-40). 
In addition to the same she was receiving $308.00 in food 
stamps, (T-41), for a total of $778.00 from public assistance. 
Defendant on the other hand is ordered to pay $410.00 
as and for child support, and the sunn of $200.00 permanent 
alimony. 
On the conclusion of the trial, at page 220, of the 
transcript is the following: 
MR. WALSH: Your Honor, are you going to make a deter-
mination on alimony and for how long? 
THE COURT: Alimony would be permanent. That will be 
permanent is this case. I make the --
MR. WALSH: For the rest of her life? 
THE COURT: So long as she's unmarried. 
MR. WALSH: And in what amount? 
THE COURT: I said I wouldn't make that determination 
until I have had an opportunity to go--
I!m going to do through this, and she'll 
be awarded alimony, no question about that. 
I just want to know whether it can be 
retroactive or not. 
Then as noted in paragraph #2 of the Decree of Divorce, 
the Defendant was to pay alimony in the sum of $200.00 forever: 
#2. Plaintiff is awarded the sum of $200 a month 
permanent alimony due and payable each month com-
mencing and payable on or before the 6th day of 
each month with first payment payable on or before 
the 6th of January, 1992. 
Under the facts of this case, one hundred per cent of 
any and all sums paid by the Defendant go to the State of Utah, 
to recover che $778.00 they supply in public assistance. 
As noted above Defendant pays $410 for child support 
and the sum of $200.00 alimony, for a total support obligation 
of $610.00. 
However, Plaintiff actually gets more from public assist-
ance and therefore would take the $778.00 from public assist-
ance than the $610.00 from the Defendant as support. 
Under the present arrangement by the Court, the Plaintiff 
has a motive in which to remain on public assistance, and the 
Defendant is forever strapped where he can not complete his 
education, and struck at $9.00 per hour. 
Defendant called Dennis Boyd as an Expert Witness, who 
testified on page 209 as follows: 
Q. In reference to pay, excuse me, if Tom Weaver were 
to say he made $9.00 an hour, would you say thatfs 
on the bottom or top of the pay scale? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
I would say that's on the top of the pay scale. 
Do you have employees yourself? 
Yes, I do. 
How many employees? 
At different times I have had as many as 32 working 
for me at one time. Presently, right now, I have 
three employees. 
Q. Do you have any employees that make $9 or more? 
A. Mo, I do not. 
As noted above, alimony should not be a punishment 
or reward and is intended to prevent the receiving spouse from 
becoming a public charge. 
Alimony on the other hand, should enable the Plaintiff 
to maintain, nearly as possible, a standard of living that was 
enjoyed during the marriage. 
Mote Davis vs. DaVis, 749 P. 2d 647, (Utah 1938), 
Fletcher vs. Fletcher, 615 ?. 2d 1213, (Utah 1930); Gardner 
vs. GarlTrfey, 748 P. 2d 1076, (Utah 1983); Georgedes vs. Georgedes, 
627 P. 2d 44, (Utah 1981); Faffel vs. Paffel, 732 P. 2d, 69, 
(Utah 1986); Ueppson vs. Jeppsoh, 634 P. 2d 69, (Utah 1984); 
Bushell vs. Bushell, 649 P. 2d 85, (Utah 1932); Burt vs. Burt, 
799 P. 2d 1166, (Utah App. 1990) and Talley vs. Talley, 739 P. 
2d 33, (Utah App. 1987). 
The difficulty that this Court has is in determining 
what the standard of living was during the course of the parties 
marriage, because the parties from the very beginning were in 
debt beyond their control, and both sets of parents helped in 
no small way. 
Each of the parties testified how they had borrowed 
more money and more money, from the respective parents. 
At page 20 of the transcript, the Plaintiff testified: 
We borrowed $6,000.00 from his father and he put us 
on a time payment of $50.00 a month for the next ten 
years. And we paid off several other outstanding 
bills with that also. 
Again on page 57, the Plaintiff testified on cross 
examination: 
Q. Now, itfs also fair to say that Tom had a loan 
with his parents to help with school, did he not? 
A. School and family expenses. 
Q. And it's fair to say that Tom had been going to 
school and paying for tuition and books and 
other things out of that account, isn't that 
correct? 
A. Ye§. And we also paid other things from that 
account. 
Defendant Tom Weaver, tesuified in reference to Exhibit 
#8-D on page 101 and 102 as follows: 
Q. Let's go over this real quickly. It has already 
been admitted, so we have it clear as to what 
this represents. It shows a loan or a beginning 
money amount of $6,000 on the 26th day of 
June of last year. Do you recall that? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Where did you borrow the money? 
A. From my father. 
Q. Did you normally sign a written agreement with your 
father with reference to this loan? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you been making payments on that loan? 
A. I have. For a while I couldn't make payments. I 
just didn'.t have the money so-- but 1 think three months 
ago I started making payments again. There's 
payments made all along. Part of it was from this 
money. I have to take out of this because I can't 
make it off my payroll. 
Q. I'll come back to that in a minute. What did 
the $6,000.00 go for? 
A. It was a consolidation of, I think, our Sears, 
Master card and University Credit Union overdraft 
and stereo, home stereo and the car. 
Not only did the parties borrow from the Defendant 
parents to maintain their standard of living, the Plaintiff's 
folks also helped substantially. (T-15) . 
Defendant respectfully submits that it is impossible 
to determine alimony based upon the standard of living 
analysis, since the standard of living was based upon borrowing 
money form the respective parents, writing bad checks, credit 
cards to the limit, etc. 
Defendant submits that the correct analysis is for the 
Court t o equalize the parties standard of living after divorce. 
Note Maxwell vs. Maxwell, 754 P. 2d 84, (Utah App. 1988) 
Olson vs. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, (Utah 1985) Higley vs. Higley, 
676 P. 2d 379, (Utah 1983); Rasband vs, Rasband, 752 P. 2d 
1331, (Utah App. 1988) and Howell vs. Howell, 806 P. 2d 109 (Utah 
App. 1991.) . 
Under this analysis the Court should look at his 
present income of $1,387.00 gross per month. After appropriate 
taxes, F.I.C.A., which are required by law to be withdrawn, are 
taken into account, the Defendant then pays the sum of $410.00 
as and for child support. 
Defendant would be required to pay for insurance for the 
minor children under 30-3-5, as well as for one half of all 
work or education related child care costs. 
Plaintiff in turn is contributing to the financial sit-
uation between the parties as best she can. 
If she is making minimum wage, then she has a gross 
income per month of approximately $772.00 per month, 
which after taxes etc., places her almost exactly where the 
Defendant is after paying his taxes, etc., and the $410.00 
per month as and for child support. 
This approach does not penalize or reward either party 
in the divorce, and creates a situation where Plaintiff is 
no longer on public assistance, as she has between $900.00 
a month and $1,000.00 a month to live on instead of the $778.00 
she gets through public assistance. 
Defendant respectfully subnits that it was an abuse 
of discretion t o reward the Plaintiff with the permanent alimony 
of $200.00 per month, instead of analyzing the parties financial 
condition and then equalizing the same. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant submits that there is no basis 
for an award of alimony in this case, and especially an 
award of permanent alimony. 
The parties were married for too short of time, and 
each of the parties are in a relative equal position 
financially. 
The only appropriate way to determine alimony is based 
upon the equality of standard of living, after the divorce, 
and in using this analysis one ^ets the same result, as they 
do, if they consider that she is residing with a member of 
the opposite sex and in fact have sexual relations, ie: 
no alimony at all. 
Defendant/Appellant respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the lower Court determination and hold that 
no alimony be required of the Defendant/Appellant. /--—\ 
E.espectfully submitted this 3rd day oJf-March',' 1993. 
JOHN WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo-.— 
WENDY E. WEAVER, 
TN'° Judicial Dtetritt' 
Plaintiff, 
- V 8 -
THOMAS A. WEAVER, JR., 
Defendant. 
D E C R E E 
FEB 0 7 1992 
Case No. 904903 
Judge John Rokich 
G^v^\ 
—oooOooo---
The above entitled matter having come on regularly for 
hearing in the above entitled Court before the Honorable John Rokich 
on the 5 and 6 days of December, 1991, and the plaintiff appearing 
in person and represented by counsel, George H. Searle, and defendant 
appearing in person and represented by counsel, John Walsh, and both 
parties having presented testimony and evidence in support of the 
allegations set forth in their respective pleadings, the Court now 
being fully advised in the premises and having heretofore made and 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law herein: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the plaintiff, Wendy Weaver be and she is 
hereby and herewith granted and awarded a divorce, dissolving the 
marriage contract and bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between 
plaintiff and defendant, Thomas A. Weaver, Jr., said Decree to become 
absolute and final upon entry by the Court in the register of actions, 
2. Plaintiff is awarded the sum of $200 a month permanent 
alimony due and payable each month commencing and payable on or 
before the 6 day of each month with first payment payable on or 
before the 6 January, 1992. 
3.Plaintiff is hereby and herewith awarded the care, custody 
and control of the three minor children: Ashley Elaine Weaver, Amy 
Lynn Weaver and Emily Elizabeth Weaver, subject to reasonable rights 
of visitation by the defendant therewith at reasonable times and 
places. 
4. Defendant is ordered to pay directly to plaintiff child 
support money in the amount as currently or hereafter in the future 
determined by the Utah Child Support Guidelines presently amounting 
for the three children to be the sum of $410 each month based upon 
defendants income of $1387 gross a month. If defendant becomes delin-
quent in his child support obligation, in an amount at least equal 
to child support payable for one month, then plaintiff shall be 
entitled to mandatory income withholding relief pursuant to State 
law. This income withholding procedure shall apply to existing and 
future payors. 
5.Further, the defendant shall provide for the maintenance 
and support of the said minor children until each attain the age of 
majority as follows: 
(a) Obtain, carry and provide reasonable Hospital,medical, 
- J 2 -
and dental insurance for the benefit and future protection of 
the said minor children. 
6. During the course of the marriage relationship, the 
parties have acquired personal property. Said personal property 
of the parties is awarded and shall be distributed as follows: 
(a) To the plaintiff, free and clear of any r 
title or claim of title by the defendant therein, to-wit: 
1980 Buick Skylark vehicle. Serial No. 4B695AW2824233. 
Kitchen table and chairs. Lawn Mower 
Living room couch. Electric Carpet Sweeper 
m ui i Camera 
Table lamp. 
Lamp with stand. 
Television 
Mic ro wave oven 
Stereo 
Ashleys dresser 
Twins cribs 
Clothes washer 
Clothes dryer 
(b) To the defendant free and clear of any ri 
title or claim of title by the plaintiff therein, to-wit: 
Mazda Pickup Truck Love Seat Couch 
T • A. rr J i_ • Toaster 
Living room stuffed chair 
Coffee Table 
Living rpom chair 
(c) All remaining personal property is awarde 
to each of the parties as they now have possession thereof. 
7. Defendant be and he is hereby and herewith ordered and 
required to pay and hold plaintiff harmless on ^ny *™^-
(1) University of Utah Credit Union debtf.) 
(2) Bill Consolidation loan. 
(3) Citi Corp Bank Card 
(4) Investment loan. 
(5) Sears charge account. 
(6) State of Utah Recovery Service Judgment 
rendered en 19 August, 1991, in office of Recovery Servic^s^Case 
No. 62236425 Rl plus accrued amounts owed thereon. 
(7) DEbt owed to Bonneville Billing & Co£|ecti/)nj 
for non-payment of three unhonored $10 checks. 
8. Plaintiff is awarded Judgment for and defenda\nti 
ordered to pay the plaintiffs court costs in the amount oX\%ll Vrpr 
cost of Complaint filed and the further sum of $ oiooo -rr^  being' 
a reasonable amount to be awarded for the purpose of assisting the 
plaintiff in payment of attorney fees incurred and legal services 
rendered in this matter. 
9. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the 
other such documents as are required to implement the provisions 
of the Decree of Divorce entered herein by the Court, including 
all documents conveying title to plaintiff of the 1980 Buick Skylark 
-4-
Automobile. 
£*>„ 
Dated this ;£ *7 day of December7, 199tU 
John Rokich 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce to: 
John Walsh 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 202 Cove Point Plaza 
3865 South Wasatch Blvd. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
postage prepaid this pi!3 day of December, 1991. 
• 5-
George H. Searle 2903 -£09-3 Judicial Distript 
Attorney for plaintiff 
2805 South State j/hi U 7 iflop 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 \ ^ 
Tele 466-8656 ^^ * 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
AT 
WENDY E. WEAVER, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff,
 C a s e No< 904903802 DA 
-V8-
THOMAS A. WEAVER, JR., 
Defendant. 
Judge John Rokiirh , . , n . l : ;V &
 Third Juaiciai District 
FEB 0 7 1992 
— O O O O O O O — SALTLM^OUNTY 
The above entitled matter having come on ^ egtri^r^^oiT'Q^pJ.Tcia.I 
trial in the above entitled Court before the Honorable Judge 
John Rokich, on the 5 and 6 days of December, 1991, and the 
plaintiff appearing in person and represented by counsel, George 
H. Searle, and the defendant appearing in person and represented 
by counsel, John Walsh, and all that appears by the files and 
records n erein, each of the parties having presented testimony 
and evidence in support of the allegations alleged in the Complaint 
and their respective pleadings, the Court now being fully advised 
in the premises, makes the following: 
FINDINGS OB' FACT 
l.That this action was commenced more than ninety (90) days 
prior to the hearing on the 5 and 6 days of December, 1991. 
2. Plaintiff has now ana for more than th ree (3) months 
immediately prior to the commencement of this action been a bona 
fide and actual resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. Plaintiff and defendant were married to each other 
on the 30 day of November, 1985, at Boise, Idaho, and are 
presently husband and wife. 
4. Plaintiff and defendant have had three children born 
to them as issue of their marriage, to-wit: Ashley Elaine Weaver,born 
18 May, 1986, and twins, Amy Lynn Weaver and Emily Elizabeth Weaver, 
born the 18 July, 1990, presently residing with the plaintiff. 
*J 5. That for some time prior hereto, the defendant has 
treated the plaintiff cruelly, causing irreconsilable differences 
to arise as a result of associating with other women in a manner 
inconstitent with his marriage obligation to the plaintiff and 
failing, after the birth of the twins, to adequately financially 
support the plaintiff and the minor children. 
6. That plaintiff and defendant have accumulated the 
following properety, to-wit: 
Kitchen table and chairs Living room couch 
Table lamp Lamp with stand 
Television Micro Wave Oven 
Stereo Ashleys dresser 
Twins Cribs Clothes dryer 
Lawn Mower Lawn and garden tools 
Camera Electric Blender 
Electric Carpet Sweeper 1980 Buick Skylark Serial 
No.4B695AW2824233 
Love seat couch Living Room stuffed chair 
Coffee table Living room chair 
Toaster and other miscellaneous personal property in the 
possession of each. 
7. That the parties have incurred some mutual and joint 
family financial obligations ipc,J udiiift but mui limited to tfr 
to-Wlt: (1) University of Utah Credit Union Debt 
(2) Bill Consolidation Loan 
(3) City Corp Bank Card 
(4) Investment Loan 
(5) Sears Charge Ace ount 
(6) State of Utah R ecovery Service Judgment 
rendered on 19 Augus t 1991, in office of 
Recovery Service, Case No. 62236426 RI. 
(7) Debt owed Bonneville Billing and Collections 
for Non payment of three unhonored $10 checks, 
8. That the defendant is gainfully employed and earned as 
an employee of Universal Painting during 1990, the gross yearly. 
sum of $15,296 and presently earns the gross amount of $1387 monthly. 
9. Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to have the care, 
custody and control of aforesaid refer red to children, subject 
to reasonable rights of visitation by the defendant therewith at 
all reasonable times and places. 
10. Plaintiff is entitled to child support and alimony. 
11. The minor children will be in need of future medical, 
dental, hospital and health insurance coverage for their benefit 
and protection. 
12. Defendant will have a retirement benefit and the 
plaintiff is entitled to half the retirement benefit accrued during 
the marriage of the parties. 
13. Plaintiff has been compelled to empl»an attorney to 
represent her in this matter, and is without financial means or 
ability to pay for services rendered. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the marital status of the plaintiff and defendant 
be terminated and a Decree of Divorce be granted to the plaintiff 
as provided by law, as no useful purpose will be accomplished by 
prolonging the marriage longer. 
2. The care, custody and control of the three (3) minor 
children of the parties should be awarded to the plaintiff subject 
to the right of the Defendant to visit said children at reasonable 
times and places. 
3. Plaintiff is entitled to be awarded all the defendants 
right, title and interestin and to the following property free and 
clear of any claim of the defendant to-wit: 
Kitchen table and chairs, Living room couch, Table lamp, 
Lamp with stand, Television , Micro Wave oven, Stereo, 
Ashleys dresser, Twins cribs, Cloth es dryer, Clothes Washer 
Lawn mower, Electric Carpet Sweeper, Lawn and Garden tools, 
Camera, 1980 Buick Skylark, Serial No. 4B695AW2824233. 
and other personal property in her possession and control. 
4. Defendant is entitled to be awarded all the plaintiffs 
right, title and interest in and to the following, to-wit: 
Mazda PickUp Truck, Love seat couch, Living room stuffed 
chair, Coffee table, Living room chair, Toaster and other 
miscellaneous personal property in his possession and control. 
5.Plaintiff is entitled to-receive and defendant should 
be ordered to pay permanent alimony in the sum of $200 a month and 
child support money to plaintiff in the sum of $410 a month. 
6. Defendant should pay any and all mutual and joint 
family financial obligations incurred by the parties hereto-tfu^ing 
their marriage and save the other harmless from 
creditoro therctyr included and—nefr-4 ~i^,,fc.<i*i..-..t-g\-..t-.Kg f n l 1 o ^ / k 
University of Utah Credit Union debt, 
Bill Consolidation Loan 
Citi Corp Bank Card 
Investment Loan 
S^ars Charge Account 
State of Utah Recovery Service Judgment rendered on 
Aug. 19, 1991, in office of Recovery Service, Case No. 
62236426 Rl 
Debt owed Bonnevill Billing and Collections for non 
payment of three unhonored $10 checks. 
7. The defendant should be cbligated to provide for the 
benefit and protection of the minor children adequate future medical, 
dental, hospital and h ealth insurance coverage. 
8. Plaintiff should be awarded one half of his Retirement 
funds accrued during the marriage of the parties. 
9. Plaintiff is entitled to be awarded a reasonable attorney 
fee and costs of Court. 
10. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver to 
-s-
the other such documents as are required to implement the provisons 
of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
Dated this J day of Po&amtrgT, 19£iL 
BY THE COURT 
^ - 4 & 
JUDGE 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law to: 
postage prepaid this i, 22 
John Walsh, Attorney at Law 
Suite 202 Cove Point Plaza 
3865 South Wasatch Blvd. 
Salt Laek City, Utah 84109 
J 
